to get around that argument. In particular, I use linguistic data to show that an utterance of an epistemic modal sentence can be warranted, while an utterance of its suggested simple contextualist paraphrase is not.
Introduction
During the first decade of the 2000's, many theorists migrated away from a simple contextualist account of epistemic modals like 'might' and 'must'. Apparent puzzles have led some to abandon the contextualist theory of the truth-conditions of sentences involving these terms. 1 Others have responded by pairing contextualism with a complex pragmatic story. 2 But lately, some theorists -in particular, Janice Dowell (2011) and Igor Yanovich (2014) -have 1 In its place, some theorists have adopted alternative truth-conditional theories, while others have situated epistemic modals in a non-truth-conditional framework. The alternative theories include relativist -MacFarlane (2011), Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005) and Stephenson (2007 ) -expressivist -Yalcin (2007 ), Yalcin (2011 , Swanson (forthcoming) and Rothschild (2012 ) -and dynamic -Veltman (1996 , Willer (2013) , Groenendijk, Stokhof and Veltman (1996) , Beaver (2001) and Yalcin (2012) -accounts. attempted to defend the simple contextualist account against these apparent puzzles. 3 Dowell's work suggests that paying closer attention to our judgments about key cases greatly improves the prospects for the simple contextualist account. And Yanovich suggests that realizing how the context is affected by the practical goals of the inquiry helps to save the account. However, in this paper, I will use unexplored linguistic data to show that the main point of one original argument against simple contextualism is, indeed, compelling. So, I will conclude that we should, accordingly, reject the theory.
What I call simple contextualism is characterized by two theses:
(1) A sentence of the form ┌ It might be that S ┐ at a context expresses a proposition that is true just in case, where p is the proposition expressed by S at the context, p is consistent with the relevant information of the context.
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(2) The responses to an utterance of a 'might'-sentence can be explained in terms of the proposition it expresses at the context of utterance.
(1) is the contextualist proposal about the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed by a 3 The discussion in Schaffer (2011) also leads us in this direction. However, Schaffer is open to a pragmatic explanation of some of the problems, allowing that they "might only concern implicatures or other matters downstream from the propositions at issue)" (2011: 219) and also suggesting further investigation of the pragmatic solution of von Fintel and Gillies (2011) . My focus in this paper will be Dowell's work and Yanovich's work.
'might'-sentence at a context. 5 (2) is the part of the theory that makes it simple -distinguishing it from theories that rely on more complex pragmatic explanations of linguistic data. I should note that neither Dowell (2011 ) nor Yanovich (2014 explicitly endorses (2). 6 Nonetheless, much of the discussion in both papers suggests a view like simple contextualism, in which all of the explanations of the conversational data rely on only the proposition expressed. I will argue that, though Dowell and Yanovich both offer insight into the nuances of the standard objections to simple contextualism, we should still reject the simple contextualist picture as inadequate.
The outline of my argument is as follows. Given (1), there will, in each particular context, be an approximate paraphrase of the 'might'-sentence -something of the form: ┌ S is consistent with the body of information having property F ┐ (where S is a sentence and F names a 5 I phrase contextualism as a thesis about the proposition expressed by a 'might'-sentence (or as a thesis about truth-conditions, which are determined by such a proposition). I don't claim that this is a thesis about the semantic value of a 'might'-sentence. Indeed, see Ninan (2010) and Rabern (2012) for the position that contextualists can avoid some problems with embedding by separating the notion of the proposition expressed by a 'might'-sentence in a context (what they call the 'assertoric content') and the semantic value of a 'might'-sentence. This point is anticipated in Yalcin's (2007) discussion of what he calls the diagonal view. For the larger observation that the proposition expressed (assertoric content, informational content, what is said) should, in general, be distinct from the compositional semantic value (ingredient sense), see Lewis (1980 ), Dummett (1973 , Stanley (1997) and Ninan (2012) .
6 Dowell (2011) leaves open that the prejacent of a 'might'-sentence may sometimes be available for response.
MacFarlane ), von Fintel and Gillies (2011 ) and Dowell (2011 , herself, show that relying on the prejacent is not a general solution to the problem. Yanovich (2014) also mentions the prejacent, though this is in the context of a discussion of von Fintel and Gillies (2011) , and it is unclear whether he endorses such an explanatory strategy.
property). 7 I will use this fact to argue against the simple contextualist view, presenting pairs of conversations that differ in appropriateness based on whether the 'might'-sentence or its proposed paraphrase is used. This will yield, for each suggested paraphrase, a disjunctive conclusion: that the paraphrase is not accurate or that it is accurate but something other than the proposition expressed by the 'might'-sentence at the context is what the response targets.
Showing this for each possible contextualist paraphrase shows either that no contextualist paraphrase is correct or that one is but something other than the proposition expressed by the 'might'-sentence at the context is being responded to. That is, this shows that we need to reject either (1) or (2) and accept either an alternative view of the proposition expressed or a more complex pragmatic account.
The Original Problem
In "A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals", Dowell responds to a number of related issues that have been pressed as problems for simple contextualism. I'm going to focus on one of these issues -responses to utterances of 'might'-sentences. 8 Here is the sort of 7 It is worth noting that such paraphrases may only be approximate. This is because, in the paraphrase, I often use a definite description to pick out the relevant body of information, even though one could hold that the body of information is picked out rigidly. The approximateness, however, does not affect our results, since we are only concerned with truth-values in this world (for instance, none of our conversations involve embedding under alethic modals, subjunctive conditionals, or attitude verbs). Thus, picking out the information by description is good enough for our purposes. Accordingly, I drop the talk of approximateness in speaking of the paraphrases. (Tattle) seems like a natural conversation in which all of the utterances are appropriate.
Remember that contextualism says that (1) a sentence of the form ┌ It might be that S ┐ at a context expresses a proposition that is true just in case, where p is the proposition expressed by S at the context, p is consistent with the relevant information of the context. In (Tattle), there seem to be two natural possibilities for what information is relevant in the context. One is that it is Skeeter's own information; the other is that it is the information distributed amongst the members of the group consisting of Beebe, Doug and Skeeter (what I will call the group's information 9 ). Let's see the problem with each of these suggestions.
though Yanovich (2014) attempts to show how his theory is consistent with the data in this area. Since Doug's reply is appropriate in (Tattle) but not (Tattle S ), one of our assumptions - (1), (2), or the assumption that Skeeter's information is relevant -must be false. Perhaps the culprit is our supposition that Skeeter's information is relevant.
So, let's investigate the other possibility -that the relevant information is the group's information. This seems to avoid the last problem. We can form a conversation, (Tattle G ), involving a contextualist paraphrase of the 'might'-sentence which -as predicted by assumption (2) -matches (Tattle) in appropriateness in this scenario:
(Tattle G ) Beebe: Skeeter, we're trying to figure out who told my parents about the party.
Skeeter: Well, it is consistent with the group's information that Patti is the leads to the same problem as the thesis that it is Skeeter's own information that is relevant. The shared information of any group cannot be more informative than the information of any member of the group. For more on group information, see Cook (2013 
Dowell's Reply and Challenges to Warrant
Dowell responds to this dilemma in two steps. First, she argues that the sorts of cases that are typically used to make this argument are under-described. She thinks that, as a result, our intuitions about appropriateness of conversations like (Tattle) are often unclear, weak, or wavering. Whether or not she is right about this, she allows that there are ways of describing the situation in which (Tattle) takes place where we do have a clear intuition that Doug's reply is appropriate. It is in this context that she makes the second, and more important, part of her reply.
She asks us to distinguish an assertion's being semantically competent from its being epistemically warranted. Believing the proposition asserted is a necessary condition for an assertion to be semantically competent, while being justified in believing it is a necessary condition for that assertion to be epistemically warranted. Dowell realizes that an assertion can be semantically competent without being epistemically warranted, and this is what she claims is the case in (Tattle). Our intuition that Skeeter's utterance of the 'might'-sentence is appropriate is, she suggests, an intuition that his assertion is semantically competent, not that it is warranted.
Thus, she claims that the argument against the group reading, which assumes that Skeeter's utterance is warranted, fails and that we can retain simple contextualism.
Unfortunately, the linguistic data do not bear out Dowell's claim about Skeeter's utterance being unwarranted in (Tattle). 10 These data show that Skeeter's assertion is warranted while the group reading paraphrase is not. Contrasting the following two conversations precisifies the warrant argument in a way that is immune to Dowell's reply. Both of these 10 Dowell (2011) contends that other linguistic data support her claim. Her idea is that it seems more warranted for Skeeter to ask, "Might Patti be the tattler?" than it is for him to say, "Patti might be the tattler." The robustness of this intuition may be questioned. More importantly, to the extent that it is a common judgment, it could easily be accommodated pragmatically by a theory that denies part (2) of simple contextualism. A pragmatic explanation of the contrasting data that I give is harder to come by, since the simple contextualist holds that Skeeter asserts similar propositions in (Tattle Warrant) and (Tattle Warrant*).
conversations take place against the same background as (Tattle assuming simple contextualism, we should conclude that the problem is simple contextualism itself. Thus, the Dowellian defense of simple contextualism fails, and we need to reject (1) -the contextualist theory of the proposition expressed by a 'might'-sentence -or (2) -the claim that responses to an utterance of a 'might'-sentence can be explained in terms of the proposition expressed by that sentence at the context of utterance.
Yanovich's Practical Contextualism
MacFarlane's idea is that there can be no body of information that explains both why an agent can be warranted in assertively uttering a 'might'-sentence and why a hearer can respond based on her own information. Yanovich (2014) Unfortunately, this account falls prey to the same sort of argument that I gave in the previous section. In particular, there are cases where the utterance of a 'might'-sentence is warranted, while the utterance of the Practical Contextualist paraphrase is not. This will show either that the Practical Contextualist paraphrase is not the correct paraphrase of the 'might'-sentence at the context or that the hearer responds to something other than the proposition expressed by the 'might'-sentence at the context. Either way, this shows that simple contextualism, when developed in the vein of Yanovich's Practical Contextualism, is incorrect.
The case on which I will focus is like our previous case, where our characters are concerned with who tattled about the party. The only difference is that in this example, it is stipulated that the practical goal of the conversation is to figure out which person should be uninvited from the next party, which is taking place later that night. Our characters don't want to invite the person who tattled about the last party. This addition to the example is merely meant to make the prediction of Yanovich's Practical Contextualism clear. Remember that the view says that when one utters a 'might'-sentence, one expresses a proposition about what is consistent with all of the knowledge that could reasonably be obtained to help achieve the relevant practical goal in the context. In our case, the knowledge that could reasonably be obtained to help achieve the relevant practical goal is the information that could reasonably be gained before the beginning of the party. So, the contextualist paraphrase for "Patti might be the tattler" in the context of the scenario is something like "It is consistent with all of the information that can be obtained by us in the next couple of hours that Patti is the tattler." As we will see, a speaker can be warranted in assertively uttering the former sentence without being warranted in assertively uttering the later:
(Tattle Warrant 2) Beebe: Skeeter, we're trying to figure out who told my parents about our last party, so that we can uninvite her from the party tonight. belief about what knowledge could reasonably be obtained to help achieve the relevant practical goal without having a justified belief about the information of another agent." The problem, however, is that most cases aren't instances of this possibility claim. In most cases (including our scenario), the knowledge of the members of one's conversational group is obviously part of the knowledge that could reasonably be obtained to help achieve the relevant practical goal.
Furthermore, speakers are generally in a position to know this. This distributed knowledge of the members of the group is, in many cases, inconsistent with the prejacent. This means that the knowledge that could reasonably be obtained to help achieve the relevant practical goal is inconsistent with the prejacent. Since speakers are generally in a position to know that this information can be reasonably obtained, it seems that standards of warrant will, in most cases, be at least as high for the Practical Contextualist as for the group contextualist. That is, almost every case that presented a problem for a group reading of a 'might'-sentence will present a problem for a Practical Contextualist reading. 11 So, we are forced to give up either Practical
Contextualism or the claim that speakers in these scenarios respond to the proposition expressed by the 'might'-sentence.
Contextualism and Dowell's Intentionalism
Dowell proposes a more general explanatory model than we have entertained so far; it says that the information relative to which an utterance of an epistemic modal claim is made is determined by the publicly manifest intentions of the speaker. 12 This position is general in the 11 Exceptions will include, at least, cases where members of the group are unable to communicate with the speaker (perhaps because they are mute, gagged, etc.) or where the practical goal must be achieved so quickly that other group members don't have time to share their information with the speaker. But these are just a small subset of the cases that need to be explained.
Dowell says:
Which body of information is contextually relevant is determined by the speaker's publicly manifestable intention for her addressee to recognize some feature of the context as helping to manifest what she takes to determine a body of information in that context. (2011: 5) sense that an agent could intend, in any particular case, to make her claim relative to her own information, the group's information, the information which could reasonably be obtained to help achieve the relevant practical goal, or some other body of information. 
